Scepticism and Wittgenstein's On Certainty

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11210%2F10%3A10111335" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11210/10:10111335 - isvavai.cz</a>

Result on the web

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Result language

angličtina

Original language name

Scepticism and Wittgenstein's On Certainty

Original language description

This article challenges the orthodox interpretation of Wittgenstein's On Certainty which treats his attitude to scepticism as uniformly negative. Reasons are given for the conclusion that although Wittgenstein thinks that scepticism says nothing, he holds that is shows us something very important. In particular, it shows us what propositions stand fast for us (hinge propositions), and it demonstrate that our attachment to these propositions is not grounded in reason.

Czech name

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Czech description

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Type

D - Article in proceedings

CEP classification

AA - Philosophy and religion

OECD FORD branch

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Project

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Continuities

V - Vyzkumna aktivita podporovana z jinych verejnych zdroju

Publication year

2010

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Article name in the collection

Filosoficky Casopis

ISBN

978-80-7007-339-1

ISSN

0015-1831

e-ISSN

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Number of pages

15

Pages from-to

9-23

Publisher name

Filosofia

Place of publication

Praha

Event location

Plzeň

Event date

Nov 5, 2009

Type of event by nationality

CST - Celostátní akce

UT code for WoS article

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