The Treadmill Argument and its Dependence on the Doctrine of Judgment

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11210%2F15%3A10296726" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11210/15:10296726 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
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DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Result language
angličtina
Original language name
The Treadmill Argument and its Dependence on the Doctrine of Judgment
Original language description
During his long career, Gottlob Frege held that truth (and falsehood) is indefinable. G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, for a considerable period, also adhered to this primitivist view. All three employed a cryptic 'treadmill' argument from vicious circularity in order to demonstrate that any attempt to define truth is impossible. My primary goal is to reconstruct this argument. There are two doctrines that must be taken into account. First, we must consider the redundancy (or, following Dummett: equivalence) thesis about truth. Second, there is a specific epistemological view which I call 'the doctrine of judgment' that had come to the adherents of the primitivism as a positive influence of Kant. If this doctrine is omitted, the circularity argument and the associate doctrine of truth-primitivism cannot be properly interpreted and seems unintelligible or even mysterious. In reference to Frege, I shall explain that the doctrine of judgment is a sequential model of knowledge-that. Its f
Czech name
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Czech description
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Publication year
2015
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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