All

What are you looking for?

All
Projects
Results
Organizations

Quick search

  • Projects supported by TA ČR
  • Excellent projects
  • Projects with the highest public support
  • Current projects

Smart search

  • That is how I find a specific +word
  • That is how I leave the -word out of the results
  • “That is how I can find the whole phrase”

THE ROLE OF INSTINCT IN DAVID HUME'S CONCEPTION OF HUMAN REASON

The result's identifiers

  • Result code in IS VaVaI

    <a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11210%2F20%3A10420307" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11210/20:10420307 - isvavai.cz</a>

  • Result on the web

    <a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=7Pm86eSOuu" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=7Pm86eSOuu</a>

  • DOI - Digital Object Identifier

    <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2020.0277" target="_blank" >10.3366/jsp.2020.0277</a>

Alternative languages

  • Result language

    angličtina

  • Original language name

    THE ROLE OF INSTINCT IN DAVID HUME'S CONCEPTION OF HUMAN REASON

  • Original language description

    This article investigates the role of instinct in Hume&apos;s understanding of human reason. It is shown that while in the Treatise Hume makes the strong reductive assertion that reason is &apos;nothing but&apos; an instinct, in the First Enquiry the corresponding statement has been modified in several ways, rendering the relation between instinct and reason more complex. Most importantly, Hume now explicitly recognises that alongside instinctive experimental reasoning, there is a uniquely human intellectual power of intuitive and demonstrative reason that is not itself an instinct. At first sight it may look as if this intellectual reason, that is capable of grasping &apos;relations of ideas&apos;, is not even grounded in instinct but is a thoroughly non-natural element in human nature. On closer analysis, however, it is shown that intellectual reason, in its apprehension of &apos;abstract&apos; and general relations, is dependent on language - the use of &apos;terms&apos; - and that language itself is grounded in instinctive associations of ideas. Thus, Hume&apos;s overall view is that even the intellect is an outgrowth of instinct and his conception of human nature is, therefore, shown to be fully naturalistic. Yet this naturalism can still make room for the &apos;exceptionalism&apos; of human mathematical thought, which has no counterpart in the animal kingdom where language is lacking.

  • Czech name

  • Czech description

Classification

  • Type

    J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database

  • CEP classification

  • OECD FORD branch

    60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Result continuities

  • Project

    <a href="/en/project/GA19-07384S" target="_blank" >GA19-07384S: Overcoming the Dualism of Mind and Matter in Modern Thought</a><br>

  • Continuities

    P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Others

  • Publication year

    2020

  • Confidentiality

    S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Data specific for result type

  • Name of the periodical

    Journal of Scottish Philosophy

  • ISSN

    1479-6651

  • e-ISSN

  • Volume of the periodical

    18

  • Issue of the periodical within the volume

    3

  • Country of publishing house

    GB - UNITED KINGDOM

  • Number of pages

    16

  • Pages from-to

    273-288

  • UT code for WoS article

    000600544700004

  • EID of the result in the Scopus database

    2-s2.0-85090642952