Revisiting abstraction and idealization : how not to criticize mechanistic explanation in molecular biology
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11210%2F22%3A10441536" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11210/22:10441536 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=0buALpJ.fV" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=0buALpJ.fV</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13194-022-00453-1" target="_blank" >10.1007/s13194-022-00453-1</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Revisiting abstraction and idealization : how not to criticize mechanistic explanation in molecular biology
Original language description
Abstraction and idealization are the two notions that are most often discussed in the context of assumptions employed in the process of model building. These notions are also routinely used in philosophical debates such as that on the mechanistic account of explanation. Indeed, an objection to the mechanistic account has recently been formulated precisely on these grounds: mechanists cannot account for the common practice of idealizing difference-making factors in models in molecular biology. In this paper I revisit the debate and I argue that the objection does not stand up to scrutiny. This is because it is riddled with a number of conceptual inconsistencies. By attempting to resolve the tensions, I also draw several general lessons regarding the difficulties of applying abstraction and idealization in scientific practice. Finally, I argue that more care is needed only when speaking of abstraction and idealization in a context in which these concepts play an important role in an argument, such as that on mechanistic explanation.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Result continuities
Project
<a href="/en/project/GA19-04236S" target="_blank" >GA19-04236S: Simplifying assumptions and non-causal explanations</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Others
Publication year
2022
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
European Journal for Philosophy of Science
ISSN
1879-4912
e-ISSN
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Volume of the periodical
12
Issue of the periodical within the volume
1
Country of publishing house
DE - GERMANY
Number of pages
20
Pages from-to
1-20
UT code for WoS article
000765764100003
EID of the result in the Scopus database
2-s2.0-85126212203