The person at law from the point of view of pure legal science

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11220%2F13%3A10120769" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11220/13:10120769 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="http://www.ilaw.cas.cz/tlq/index.php/tlq/article/view/59/49" target="_blank" >http://www.ilaw.cas.cz/tlq/index.php/tlq/article/view/59/49</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Result language
angličtina
Original language name
The person at law from the point of view of pure legal science
Original language description
The person as a legal term is traditionally derived from a human being, either from an individual or a group of people. Hans Kelsen maintains that no such substance really exists. "The person exists only insofar as he "has" duties and rights; apart fromthem the person has no existence whatsoever." This is why a human being is construed as an abstract holder of subjective rights rather than the person in a legal sense. This conception results in the normative construction of a person. The person is considered to be a mere point, an ideal and never real fact. Kelsen designates this point as "personification of the set of norms" regulating the conduct of a human being. However, such an entity as the personification of legal norms does not exist in the outer, real world. The legal order may attach legal personality to any segment of the outer world, even to an imagination of something non-existent in the outer world. The relationship between this abstract point and the addressee of duties
Czech name
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Czech description
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Type
J<sub>x</sub> - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)
CEP classification
AG - Legal sciences
OECD FORD branch
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Project
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Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year
2013
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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