The Cost of Favoritism in Public Procurement

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11220%2F24%3A10482682" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11220/24:10482682 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=m45SzVQC85" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=m45SzVQC85</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/727793" target="_blank" >10.1086/727793</a>

Result language
angličtina
Original language name
The Cost of Favoritism in Public Procurement
Original language description
Are political connections in public procurement harmful or efficiency gaining for the public sector, and what are the costs of favoritism toward politically connected firms? Exploiting detailed data on firm representatives' political affiliations in the Czech Republic, we find that favoritism toward politically connected firms increases the price of procurement contracts by 6 percent of the estimated costs, while no gains in terms of quality are generated. Interestingly, these adverse effects of political connections are mitigated by additional oversight from a higher level of the government because they are cofunded by the European Union. On the basis of our estimates, total procurement expenditures increased by .36 percent owing to favoritism.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
—
OECD FORD branch
50501 - Law

Project
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Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year
2024
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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