National Parliamentary Control of EU Affairs: Institutional Design after Enlargement

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F12%3A10123223" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/12:10123223 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2012.706412" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2012.706412</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2012.706412" target="_blank" >10.1080/01402382.2012.706412</a>

Result language
angličtina
Original language name
National Parliamentary Control of EU Affairs: Institutional Design after Enlargement
Original language description
This article analyzes the differences in institutional design in national parliamentary control over European Union (EU) affairs among EU member states. It proceeds from a preference-based perspective, drawing on the principal-agent framework, and a time-based perspective, inspired by the historical institutionalist approach. The article involves a qualitative comparative analysis of strong control and a quantitative, correlation analysis of variation in the degree of control. It argues that time-basedfactors provide a more persuasive overall explanation for the differences in control than preference-based factors.
Czech name
—
Czech description
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Type
J<sub>x</sub> - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)
CEP classification
AD - Political sciences
OECD FORD branch
—

Project
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Continuities
Z - Vyzkumny zamer (s odkazem do CEZ)<br>I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year
2012
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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