Procurement Procedure, Competition and Final Unit Price: the Case of Comodities

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F16%3A10306899" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/16:10306899 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
—
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
—

Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Procurement Procedure, Competition and Final Unit Price: the Case of Comodities
Original language description
We show how institutional and procedural characteristics affect the final price in public procurement. In order to obtain comparable unit prices, our analysis only examines public procurement of homogeneous goods. We examine two Czech commodity markets: electricity and natural gas, which enables us to use a private market price as a benchmark metric. The regression analysis is based on the standard ordinary least squares method. On a dataset of 277 tenders, we find that the final unit price of the procurement is sensitive to movements in both commodity market price and price estimated ex ante by the procurer. Moreover, we identify that the final price is reduced when the procurer uses an open procedure, an electronic auction, or attracts more competitors.
Czech name
—
Czech description
—

Type
J<sub>x</sub> - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)
CEP classification
AH - Economics
OECD FORD branch
—

Project
<a href="/en/project/GAP402%2F11%2F0948" target="_blank" >GAP402/11/0948: Developing Analytical Framework for Energy Security: Time-Series Econometrics, Game Theory, Meta-Analysis and Theory of Regulation</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Publication year
2016
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Similar results(10)