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Communication and Credibility in Multilateral Negotiations

The result's identifiers

  • Result code in IS VaVaI

    <a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F16%3A10324253" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/16:10324253 - isvavai.cz</a>

  • Result on the web

    <a href="https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=342510" target="_blank" >https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=342510</a>

  • DOI - Digital Object Identifier

    <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.5817/PC2016-1-44" target="_blank" >10.5817/PC2016-1-44</a>

Alternative languages

  • Result language

    angličtina

  • Original language name

    Communication and Credibility in Multilateral Negotiations

  • Original language description

    Multilateral negotiations form the basis of much international cooperation, but the hurdle of reaching agreement often proves insurmountable. One prominent example of such negotiations is the Doha round of trade liberalization talks in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The round has already lasted more than fourteen years but, so far, has fallen short of its original ambition. This article identifies one possible reason why multilateral negotiations such as those of the Doha round face difficulties, namely the dysfunctional communication among states. I contend that a state's ability to effectively articulate its interests is inhibited when its interests are dispersed across a number of issues under negotiation rather than focused on one or two primary areas. For straightforward domestic political reasons, a state that pursues multiple interests in negotiations will have difficulty in credibly communicating its position to other participants. This decreases the efficiency of negotiations, creates delays, and may lead to negotiation deadlock. I test this proposition with the use of a newly collected dataset of coded public statements by representatives of WTO member states at the eight ministerial conferences between 1996 and 2011.

  • Czech name

  • Czech description

Classification

  • Type

    J<sub>x</sub> - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)

  • CEP classification

    AD - Political sciences

  • OECD FORD branch

Result continuities

  • Project

    <a href="/en/project/GA15-12533S" target="_blank" >GA15-12533S: Member states in the WTO: preferences, compliance, and monitoring</a><br>

  • Continuities

    P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Others

  • Publication year

    2016

  • Confidentiality

    S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Data specific for result type

  • Name of the periodical

    Politologický časopis

  • ISSN

    1211-3247

  • e-ISSN

  • Volume of the periodical

    2016

  • Issue of the periodical within the volume

    1

  • Country of publishing house

    CZ - CZECH REPUBLIC

  • Number of pages

    21

  • Pages from-to

    44-64

  • UT code for WoS article

  • EID of the result in the Scopus database

    2-s2.0-84963799199