New Powers and the Distribution of Preferences in Global Trade Governance: From Deadlock and Drift to Fragmentation
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F19%3A10377725" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/19:10377725 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=z_V8arqosW" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=z_V8arqosW</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2018.1509065" target="_blank" >10.1080/13563467.2018.1509065</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
New Powers and the Distribution of Preferences in Global Trade Governance: From Deadlock and Drift to Fragmentation
Original language description
Existing theories make divergent predictions about the impact of new powers on the global political economy. Some argue that a more even distribution of power will erode international cooperation, while others argue that cooperation can continue with the help of international institutions to overcome collective action problems. We argue that this debate overlooks a critical determinant of the shape of power transitions: the distribution of preferences amongst the major powers. It is primarily in the context of divergent preferences that power transitions are likely to give rise to conflict. Moreover, even where preferences diverge, the gains of cooperation provide a strong incentive to continue to pursue goals through multilateralism. This situation leads to forms of institutional change unanticipated by established theories. These include deadlock in expansive multilateral fora, institutional drift as old rules cannot keep up with the changing political and economic context, and fragmentation as countries seek minilateral solutions that reduce preference diversity. We develop this preference-based, institutional argument by examining the distribution of preferences and institutional change at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its Doha Round, where the power transition is relatively advanced.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
50601 - Political science
Result continuities
Project
<a href="/en/project/GA17-10543S" target="_blank" >GA17-10543S: Global bureaucracy: The politics of international organizations staffing</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Others
Publication year
2019
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
New Political Economy
ISSN
1356-3467
e-ISSN
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Volume of the periodical
24
Issue of the periodical within the volume
6
Country of publishing house
US - UNITED STATES
Number of pages
24
Pages from-to
735-758
UT code for WoS article
000486315500001
EID of the result in the Scopus database
2-s2.0-85051803373