Why states inform : Compliance with self-reporting obligations in universal treaty regimes
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F22%3A10425883" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/22:10425883 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=Q7eGHMkfP5" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=Q7eGHMkfP5</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0192512121990575" target="_blank" >10.1177/0192512121990575</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Why states inform : Compliance with self-reporting obligations in universal treaty regimes
Original language description
Why do some states largely comply with their self-reporting obligations in international institutions, while others fulfil them only irregularly? In this article, I conduct the first large-N analysis of self-reporting that comprises several important areas of international cooperation. This analysis relies on an original and large dataset that covers self-reporting within 25 universal arms control, environmental and human rights agreements. The empirical results find little evidence for an intuitive view that the support of states for the respective treaties and the conformity of state policies with the general goals of those treaties drive compliance with self-reporting obligations. Instead, the article reveals that this compliance is mainly influenced by the reporting behaviour of the country's regional peers and by national economic and administrative capacities.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
—
OECD FORD branch
50601 - Political science
Result continuities
Project
<a href="/en/project/GA21-08124S" target="_blank" >GA21-08124S: Ratification of universal arms control treaties: explanatory factors</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Others
Publication year
2022
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
International Political Science Review
ISSN
0192-5121
e-ISSN
1460-373X
Volume of the periodical
43
Issue of the periodical within the volume
3
Country of publishing house
GB - UNITED KINGDOM
Number of pages
16
Pages from-to
531-546
UT code for WoS article
000628958900001
EID of the result in the Scopus database
2-s2.0-85102386148