Balancing financial incentives during COVID-19: a comparison of provider payment adjustments across 20 countries

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F22%3A10432847" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/22:10432847 - isvavai.cz</a>

Result on the web

<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=1YWNjfl7wb" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=1YWNjfl7wb</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2021.09.015" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.healthpol.2021.09.015</a>

Result language

angličtina

Original language name

Balancing financial incentives during COVID-19: a comparison of provider payment adjustments across 20 countries

Original language description

Provider payment mechanisms were adjusted in many countries in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Our objective was to review adjustments for hospitals and healthcare professionals across 20 countries. We developed an analytical framework distinguishing between payment adjustments compensating income loss and those covering extra costs related to COVID-19. Information was extracted from the Covid-19 Health System Response Monitor (HSRM) and classified according to the framework. We found that income loss was not a problem in countries where professionals were paid by salary or capitation and hospitals received global budgets. In countries where payment was based on activity, income loss was compensated through budgets and higher fees. New FFS payments were introduced to incentivize remote services. Payments for COVID-19 related costs included new fees for out- and inpatient services but also new PD and DRG tariffs for hospitals. Budgets covered the costs of adjusting wards, creating new (ICU) beds, and hiring staff. We conclude that public payers assumed most of the COVID-19-related financial risk. In view of future pandemics policymakers should work to increase resilience of payment systems by: (1) having systems in place to rapidly adjust payment systems; (2) being aware of the economic incentives created by these adjustments such as cost-containment or increasing the number of patients or services, that can result in unintended consequences such as risk selection or overprovision of care; and (3) periodically evaluating the effects of payment adjustments on access and quality of care.

Czech name

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Czech description

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Type

J_imp - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database

CEP classification

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OECD FORD branch

50602 - Public administration

Project

—

Continuities

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year

2022

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Name of the periodical

Health Policy

ISSN

0168-8510

e-ISSN

—

Volume of the periodical

126

Issue of the periodical within the volume

5

Country of publishing house

IE - IRELAND

Number of pages

10

Pages from-to

398-407

UT code for WoS article

000814021500008

EID of the result in the Scopus database

2-s2.0-85117955833