The “Commitment Trap” Revisited: Experimental Evidence on Ambiguous Nuclear Threats
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F24%3A10458562" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/24:10458562 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=701w87PTAv" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=701w87PTAv</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/XPS.2023.8" target="_blank" >10.1017/XPS.2023.8</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
The “Commitment Trap” Revisited: Experimental Evidence on Ambiguous Nuclear Threats
Original language description
In this paper, we provide an empirical test for the theoretical claim that ambiguous nuclear threats create a "commitment trap" for American leaders: when deterrence fails, supposedly they are more likely to order the use of nuclear weapons to avoid domestic audience costs for backing down. We designed an original survey experiment and fielded it to a sample of 1,000 U.S. citizens. We found no evidence of a commitment trap when ambiguous nuclear threats are made. Unlike explicit threats, ambiguous ones did not generate domestic disapproval when the leader backed down; the decision to employ nuclear weapons led to more public backlash for the leader than being caught bluffing; and the threats did not influence public preference for nuclear use across our scenarios. Our findings contribute to the scholarly literature on nuclear crisis bargaining and policy debates over the future of US declaratory policy.
Czech name
—
Czech description
—
Classification
Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
—
OECD FORD branch
50601 - Political science
Result continuities
Project
—
Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Others
Publication year
2024
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
Journal of Experimental Political Science
ISSN
2052-2649
e-ISSN
2052-2649
Volume of the periodical
11
Issue of the periodical within the volume
1
Country of publishing house
GB - UNITED KINGDOM
Number of pages
14
Pages from-to
64-77
UT code for WoS article
000946791300001
EID of the result in the Scopus database
2-s2.0-85150347085