Annexation Attempts as a Two-Level Game: Israel and the West Bank in 1967 and 2020
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F24%3A10480364" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/24:10480364 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=xvDn4ln7gW" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=xvDn4ln7gW</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogae013" target="_blank" >10.1093/jogss/ogae013</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Annexation Attempts as a Two-Level Game: Israel and the West Bank in 1967 and 2020
Original language description
Annexation attempts threaten international security and the rules-based world order. Yet, studies of annexation are rare, whilst the scant relevant literature is great-power centric. This article therefore asks why some non-great power annexations succeed, whereas others do not. Applying Putnam's two-level game framework, it analyses an occupier's: (1) domestic politics; (2) international relations; and (3) interactions between these two levels of analysis. It applies this framework to Israeli policy in two specific cases: partial annexation, where Israel annexed East Jerusalem but not the entire West Bank (1967); and Israel's comprehensive but aborted West Bank annexation (2020). This article finds that when the policy would yield maximum domestic returns and minimal global opprobrium, Israel's leaders enacted annexation. They refrained from doing so when this synchronization was absent. These findings illustrate the utility of the two-level game framework for explaining non-great powers' decision-making and their territorial policies in particular.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
50601 - Political science
Result continuities
Project
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Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Others
Publication year
2024
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
The Journal of Global Security Studies
ISSN
2057-3170
e-ISSN
2057-3189
Volume of the periodical
9
Issue of the periodical within the volume
2
Country of publishing house
US - UNITED STATES
Number of pages
20
Pages from-to
1-20
UT code for WoS article
001222895600001
EID of the result in the Scopus database
2-s2.0-85193568788