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Deterrence strength in TV fee enforcement: Field evidence from the Czech Republic

The result's identifiers

  • Result code in IS VaVaI

    <a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F24%3A10482558" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/24:10482558 - isvavai.cz</a>

  • Result on the web

    <a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=93266-Eiw4" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=93266-Eiw4</a>

  • DOI - Digital Object Identifier

    <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2024.102245" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.socec.2024.102245</a>

Alternative languages

  • Result language

    angličtina

  • Original language name

    Deterrence strength in TV fee enforcement: Field evidence from the Czech Republic

  • Original language description

    Nudges have been shown to influence behavior across various domains, including tax payments. Although nudges that exploit the deterrence motivation are generally considered most effective, evidence of their effectiveness in terms of the degree of deterrent information included is limited. To address these gaps, we conducted a natural mailing experiment to measure compliance with TV fee payments among a sample of households that failed to respond to an initial communication. In addition to studying the strength of deterrence, our study investigates the impact of treatment timing and content simplification on the compliance rate. The results reveal substantial effects of the strongest deterrent information, resulting in a 25 % increase in the payment registration rate. Treatments with a lower deterrence level did not show improvement from the baseline. We also demonstrate that timing matters, as reminders sent closer to the original response deadline (i.e., earlier) motivate 18 % more households to register for payment. The combined effect of the strongest deterrence and simplification leads to a 59 % increase in registrations. This implies that people are more likely to exhibit compliant behavior when the potential consequences of noncompliance are made more salient, and information is conveyed in a timely and simplified manner.

  • Czech name

  • Czech description

Classification

  • Type

    J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database

  • CEP classification

  • OECD FORD branch

    50201 - Economic Theory

Result continuities

  • Project

  • Continuities

    I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Others

  • Publication year

    2024

  • Confidentiality

    S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Data specific for result type

  • Name of the periodical

    Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics

  • ISSN

    2214-8043

  • e-ISSN

    2214-8051

  • Volume of the periodical

    112

  • Issue of the periodical within the volume

    OCT 2024

  • Country of publishing house

    NL - THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS

  • Number of pages

    17

  • Pages from-to

    102245

  • UT code for WoS article

    001270515500001

  • EID of the result in the Scopus database

    2-s2.0-85196867715