Nonlinear incentive schemes and corruption in public procurement: evidence from the Czech Republic
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11640%2F13%3A00383151" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11640/13:00383151 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp483.pdf" target="_blank" >http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp483.pdf</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Nonlinear incentive schemes and corruption in public procurement: evidence from the Czech Republic
Original language description
This article uses data on Czech public procurement contracts from 2005 - 2010 in order to uncover patterns suggestive of corrupt behavior of procuring officials. Using polynomial regressions and local linear density estimators, the article provides evidence that procurement officials manipulate anticipated values of procurements so that contracts can be awarded through less transparent procedures with restricted entry. Manipulations manifest through emergence of sharp discontinuities in the anticipatedvalue distribution. Procurements excessively bunch below statutory thresholds, which determine officials? scope of discretion, entry-restrictiveness and transparency of the contract-awarding process.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
O - Miscellaneous
CEP classification
AH - Economics
OECD FORD branch
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Result continuities
Project
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Continuities
S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach<br>I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Others
Publication year
2013
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů