Fast-track authority: a hold-up interpretation

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11640%2F20%3A00534246" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11640/20:00534246 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2020.103392" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2020.103392</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2020.103392" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.jinteco.2020.103392</a>

Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Fast-track authority: a hold-up interpretation
Original language description
Under Fast-Track Authority (FT), the US Congress commits to an up-or-down vote without amendments for any trade agreement presented for ratification. We interpret FT in terms of a hold-up problem. If the US negotiates an agreement with a smaller economy, businesses there may make sunk investments for the US market. At the ratification stage, the partner economy will be locked in to the US in a way it was not previously and Congress can make changes adverse to the partner, so to convince the partner to negotiate, it must first commit not to amend the agreement. FT is then Pareto-improving.
Czech name
—
Czech description
—

Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
—
OECD FORD branch
50201 - Economic Theory

Project
—
Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year
2020
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Similar results(10)