Electoral competition with rationally inattentive voters

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11640%2F21%3A00553078" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11640/21:00553078 - isvavai.cz</a>

Alternative codes found

RIV/67985998:_____/21:00542972

Result on the web

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvaa042" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvaa042</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvaa042" target="_blank" >10.1093/jeea/jvaa042</a>

Result language

angličtina

Original language name

Electoral competition with rationally inattentive voters

Original language description

This paper studies how voters’ selective ignorance interacts with policy design by political candidates. It shows that the selectivity empowers voters with extreme preferences and small groups, that divisive issues attract most attention, and that public goods are underfunded. Finer granularity of information increases these inefficiencies. Rational inattention can also explain why competing opportunistic candidates do not always converge on the same policy issues.

Czech name

—

Czech description

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Type

J_imp - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database

CEP classification

—

OECD FORD branch

50201 - Economic Theory

Project

—

Continuities

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year

2021

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Name of the periodical

Journal of the European Economic Association

ISSN

1542-4766

e-ISSN

1542-4774

Volume of the periodical

19

Issue of the periodical within the volume

3

Country of publishing house

US - UNITED STATES

Number of pages

37

Pages from-to

1899-1935

UT code for WoS article

000674703700012

EID of the result in the Scopus database

2-s2.0-85110961225