Information disclosure in elections with sequential costly participation
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11640%2F22%3A00556776" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11640/22:00556776 - isvavai.cz</a>
Alternative codes found
RIV/25840886:_____/22:N0000030
Result on the web
<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-021-00938-2" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-021-00938-2</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-021-00938-2" target="_blank" >10.1007/s11127-021-00938-2</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Information disclosure in elections with sequential costly participation
Original language description
Using a pivotal costly voting model of elections in which voters privately have formed preferences over two candidates and act sequentially, I study how different rules for disclosing information about the actions of early voters affect the actions of later voters, and how they ultimately affect voters' and candidates' welfare. Comparing three rules observed in real-life elections (no information disclosure, turnout disclosure and vote count disclosure), I find that vote count disclosure dominates the other two rules in terms of both voter welfare and the ex-ante likelihood of electing the candidate preferred by the majority. I show further that each of the rules can provide a candidate with either a greater or lesser chance of winning, depending on the levels of ex-ante support for the candidates. The findings may be useful for designing optimal voting procedures, particularly in settings with small numbers of voters.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
—
OECD FORD branch
50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics
Result continuities
Project
<a href="/en/project/GJ19-18741Y" target="_blank" >GJ19-18741Y: The Efficiency of Electoral Policies under Costly Voting</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Others
Publication year
2022
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
Public Choice
ISSN
0048-5829
e-ISSN
1573-7101
Volume of the periodical
190
Issue of the periodical within the volume
3-4
Country of publishing house
NL - THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS
Number of pages
28
Pages from-to
317-344
UT code for WoS article
000713913700001
EID of the result in the Scopus database
2-s2.0-85118364774