Augean Intuitive Stables: Definition of Moral Intuition

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14210%2F16%3A00091199" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14210/16:00091199 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="http://espp16.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/" target="_blank" >http://espp16.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Augean Intuitive Stables: Definition of Moral Intuition
Original language description
Over the last 15 years, the term moral intuition has become prominent in empirically oriented study of morality. It’s one of the central concepts in moral psychology and empirically minded moral philosophy. However, its meaning is far from being clear – various researchers use it in various ways. The unfortunate consequence of this is a conceptual mess rivaling the proverbial Augean stables. The primary aim of this paper is to clarify this conceptual confusion through thinking carefully about what we really want from a good definition of moral intuition – i.e. to which questions we expect it to provide answers. The hope is that through this we can gain some clarity on what we are dealing with when we talk about moral intuitions. The secondary aim is to show through this analysis in what ways can a philosopher be useful for the project of empirical study of morality without need to get his hands dirty with data collection.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Publication year
2016
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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