Who Is Afraid of Truth Gaps? Wittgenstein and Kripke on the Standard Meter
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14210%2F24%3A00135266" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14210/24:00135266 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003240792-7" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003240792-7</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003240792-7" target="_blank" >10.4324/9781003240792-7</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Who Is Afraid of Truth Gaps? Wittgenstein and Kripke on the Standard Meter
Original language description
I argue that Kripke’s apparent disagreement with Wittgenstein’s claims about the Standard Meter is based on two different ways of fixing reference. Kripke proposes that “meter” rigidly refers to the length that the Standard Meter has at time t0. This length is an abstract object postulated by the theory of absolute space. Wittgenstein, in contrast, seems to presuppose that “meter” rigidly refers to the Standard Meter. Both ways of fixing reference have their advantages and disadvantages. Yet Wittgenstein’s way of fixing reference entails that a statement attributing to the Standard Meter a definite length in meters is without truth-value, while for Kripke, such attributions are accidentally true or accidentally false. This truth-value gap reappears in Kripke’s modal theoretical framework. Existential and modal claims about basic particulars are without truth-value. Both Wittgenstein and Kripke cannot but allow for certain truth-value gaps, which are instances of paracomplete reasoning.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
C - Chapter in a specialist book
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Result continuities
Project
—
Continuities
S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach
Others
Publication year
2024
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Book/collection name
Engaging Kripke with Wittgenstein : The Standard Meter, Contingent Apriori, and Beyond
ISBN
9781032139975
Number of pages of the result
14
Pages from-to
127-140
Number of pages of the book
314
Publisher name
Routledge
Place of publication
New York
UT code for WoS chapter
001215437500007