Cyber Weapons Review in Situations Below the Threshold of Armed Conflict
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14220%2F20%3A00115669" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14220/20:00115669 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2020/05/CyCon_2020_book.pdf" target="_blank" >https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2020/05/CyCon_2020_book.pdf</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Cyber Weapons Review in Situations Below the Threshold of Armed Conflict
Original language description
The use of cyber weapons raises many issues, one of which is the scope of legal requirements affecting the legal review of cyber weapons under Additional Protocol I and customary international law. This paper explores the review of cyber weapons intended for use below the threshold of armed conflict. As the line between war and peace is often increasingly blurred and the majority of cyber incidents are below the threshold of armed conflict, the laws and principles of international humanitarian law do not apply. In this paper, we engage in a scenariobased thought experiment exploring the legal framework affecting the use of cyber weapons outside armed conflict. In such situations, the well-known article 36 of Additional Protocol I and customary international law are not triggered. As a result, there is no explicit legal obligation to conduct a cyber weapons review in situations when cyber weapons are deployed in situations falling below the threshold of armed conflict. Our starting point is that even though international humanitarian law is not applicable, the use of cyber weapons is not completely unregulated. In the paper, we search for answer to following research question: what are the legal requirements for weapons review in situations where their intended use is for situations below the threshold of armed conflict? We identify the black-letter legal framework and explore the state practice of NATO member states where available. The paper argues that there are many obligations to be considered when deploying cyber weapons in situations below the threshold of armed conflict. The conclusion is that there is no obligation to conduct a review outside Article 36 of Additional Protocol I. That being said, there are definitely policy benefits in conducting broader software assessment to ensure respect to international law obligations of a state.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
D - Article in proceedings
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
50501 - Law
Result continuities
Project
<a href="/en/project/EF16_019%2F0000822" target="_blank" >EF16_019/0000822: CyberSecurity, CyberCrime and Critical Information Infrastructures Center of Excellence</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Others
Publication year
2020
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Article name in the collection
2020 12th International Conference on Cyber Conflict 20/20 Vision: The Next Decade
ISBN
9789949990467
ISSN
2325-5366
e-ISSN
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Number of pages
16
Pages from-to
97-112
Publisher name
NATO CCDCOE Publications
Place of publication
Tallinn
Event location
Tallinn
Event date
Jan 1, 2020
Type of event by nationality
WRD - Celosvětová akce
UT code for WoS article
000615995100006