Human Rights as Utilitarian Project

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14220%2F24%3A00139522" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14220/24:00139522 - isvavai.cz</a>

Result on the web

<a href="https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/0913110410.31577filozofia.2024.79.7.3.pdf" target="_blank" >https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/0913110410.31577filozofia.2024.79.7.3.pdf</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2024.79.7.3" target="_blank" >10.31577/filozofia.2024.79.7.3</a>

Result language

čeština

Original language name

Lidská práva jako utilitaristický projekt

Original language description

Human rights, as a special kind of moral rights, have traditionally been seen as guides for legally institutionalized human rights practice. However, there are several problems with this conception. It seems that not every moral right makes sense to translate into a legal form, and at the same time not all legal rights have a moral antecedent. Thus, human rights ethics requires some supplementation in order to justify institutionalized rights. At the same time, it is not usually seen as final, but we expect it to be supported by further justification, for example by its relation to normative agency, basic needs or capabilities. This raises the question of whether it is redundant, whether its role could be superseded by elements that further justify it. The article defends the thesis that as such it can be superseded by utilitarian reasons. Using them, we can reach the same conclusions, but with several significant advantages over competing approaches. Utilitarianism is not only an analytically clear theory that minimizes the normative basis of our reasoning, but it can offer a justification for that practice without having to be supplemented by some other approach. At the same time, it can easily deal with the redundancy objection.

Czech name

Lidská práva jako utilitaristický projekt

Czech description

Human rights, as a special kind of moral rights, have traditionally been seen as guides for legally institutionalized human rights practice. However, there are several problems with this conception. It seems that not every moral right makes sense to translate into a legal form, and at the same time not all legal rights have a moral antecedent. Thus, human rights ethics requires some supplementation in order to justify institutionalized rights. At the same time, it is not usually seen as final, but we expect it to be supported by further justification, for example by its relation to normative agency, basic needs or capabilities. This raises the question of whether it is redundant, whether its role could be superseded by elements that further justify it. The article defends the thesis that as such it can be superseded by utilitarian reasons. Using them, we can reach the same conclusions, but with several significant advantages over competing approaches. Utilitarianism is not only an analytically clear theory that minimizes the normative basis of our reasoning, but it can offer a justification for that practice without having to be supplemented by some other approach. At the same time, it can easily deal with the redundancy objection.

Type

J_imp - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database

CEP classification

—

OECD FORD branch

50501 - Law

Project

<a href="/en/project/GA23-06790S" target="_blank" >GA23-06790S: Human Rights and Welfarism</a><br>

Continuities

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Publication year

2024

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Name of the periodical

Filozofia

ISSN

0046-385X

e-ISSN

2585-7061

Volume of the periodical

79

Issue of the periodical within the volume

7

Country of publishing house

SK - SLOVAKIA

Number of pages

15

Pages from-to

737-751

UT code for WoS article

001318847300003

EID of the result in the Scopus database

2-s2.0-85206184307