Legal meaning in Michale S. Moore‘s theory and legal certanity

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14220%2F24%3A00140111" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14220/24:00140111 - isvavai.cz</a>

Result on the web

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Result language

čeština

Original language name

Právní význam v teorii Michaela S. Moora a právní jistota

Original language description

The article examines the meaning of legal expressions in Michale S. Moore‘s theory in the context of its influence on the theory of legal certainty. After outlining the theoretical background of Moore‘s theory and summarizing realist semantics built on a causal theory of meaning, I focus on an exposition of the theory of functional kinds as meanings of legal expressions and the connection between realist semantics, the objectivity of law, and the truth of legal propositions. I then discuss two implications that are intended to favor realist semantics over competing theories, the explication of the change in meaning of the same expression in the face of disagreement and the connection of functional (and other) kinds to the determinacy of legal discourse. I criticize both implications, and especially their contribution to the standard theory of legal certainty, because I think they do not deal with straightforward epistemological objections. On the basis of this analysis, I reconstruct a preferred theory of legal certainty for realists, but present alongside it an alternative theory responsive to the previous criticisms. I evaluate both theories in terms of their immediate applicability and show how they might be integrated side by side.

Czech name

Právní význam v teorii Michaela S. Moora a právní jistota

Czech description

The article examines the meaning of legal expressions in Michale S. Moore‘s theory in the context of its influence on the theory of legal certainty. After outlining the theoretical background of Moore‘s theory and summarizing realist semantics built on a causal theory of meaning, I focus on an exposition of the theory of functional kinds as meanings of legal expressions and the connection between realist semantics, the objectivity of law, and the truth of legal propositions. I then discuss two implications that are intended to favor realist semantics over competing theories, the explication of the change in meaning of the same expression in the face of disagreement and the connection of functional (and other) kinds to the determinacy of legal discourse. I criticize both implications, and especially their contribution to the standard theory of legal certainty, because I think they do not deal with straightforward epistemological objections. On the basis of this analysis, I reconstruct a preferred theory of legal certainty for realists, but present alongside it an alternative theory responsive to the previous criticisms. I evaluate both theories in terms of their immediate applicability and show how they might be integrated side by side.

Type

J_SC - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the SCOPUS database

CEP classification

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OECD FORD branch

50501 - Law

Project

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Continuities

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year

2024

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Name of the periodical

Ratio Publica

ISSN

2787-9550

e-ISSN

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Volume of the periodical

4

Issue of the periodical within the volume

2

Country of publishing house

CZ - CZECH REPUBLIC

Number of pages

15

Pages from-to

70-84

UT code for WoS article

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EID of the result in the Scopus database

2-s2.0-105003692203