Metaphysical Vagueness, Identity of Legal Cases, and the Rule of Law

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14220%2F24%3A00142071" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14220/24:00142071 - isvavai.cz</a>

Result on the web

<a href="https://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/6611/metaphysical-vagueness-identity-of-legal-cases-and-the-rule-of-law/" target="_blank" >https://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/6611/metaphysical-vagueness-identity-of-legal-cases-and-the-rule-of-law/</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2024.2.44" target="_blank" >10.36280/AFPiFS.2024.2.44</a>

Result language

angličtina

Original language name

Metaphysical Vagueness, Identity of Legal Cases, and the Rule of Law

Original language description

In the paper, I address a little-reflected area: the influence of metaphysical vagueness on law. The purpose of this article is to make at least a partial investigation concerning the identity of legal cases precisely in the context of metaphysical vagueness. I do so specifically by analysing the challenge that, as Diana Raffman argues, is posed by the metaphysical vagueness to the rule of law principle. I oppose the construction of a metaphysical soritical series underlying the challenge by using Evans’s argument, which, when interpreted standardly, at least theoretically always allows for a distinction between legal cases, thereby blocking the possibility of constructing a metaphysical soritical series and thus the challenge itself. Subsequently, I try to answer the question whether Raffman can avoid the conclusion of Evans’s argument, which is problematic for her in the context of the law. However, Parsons’ well-known solution is found to be inapplicable on the grounds that it would lead to a radical and perhaps undesirable revision of the theory of legal cases, which Raffman, moreover, does not pursue. The contribution of the article lies in opening up the debate on the impact of metaphysical vagueness on the theory of legal cases and in arguing for a rather sceptical position regarding the implications of metaphysical vagueness, as well as in supporting the metatheoretical position of those authors who believe that philosophical theories can have important implications for arguments in legal theory, in this instance specifically the theory of legal cases.

Czech name

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Czech description

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Type

J_SC - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the SCOPUS database

CEP classification

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OECD FORD branch

50501 - Law

Project

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Continuities

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year

2024

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Name of the periodical

Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Spolecznej

ISSN

2082-3304

e-ISSN

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Volume of the periodical

39

Issue of the periodical within the volume

2

Country of publishing house

PL - POLAND

Number of pages

15

Pages from-to

44-58

UT code for WoS article

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EID of the result in the Scopus database

2-s2.0-85204965638