Judicial Independence
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14220%2F25%3A00140346" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14220/25:00140346 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/cz/universitypress/subjects/law/constitutional-and-administrative-law/cambridge-handbook-constitutional-theory?format=HB&isbn=9781108491310" target="_blank" >https://www.cambridge.org/cz/universitypress/subjects/law/constitutional-and-administrative-law/cambridge-handbook-constitutional-theory?format=HB&isbn=9781108491310</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781108868143" target="_blank" >10.1017/9781108868143</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Judicial Independence
Original language description
Despite being nearly universally recognised as a virtue, judicial independence has been challenged in almost all parts of the world. Some commentators even consider it to be so open to differing interpretations as to be a useless concept, that should be unpacked to its smaller components to be studied meaningfully. We are less cynical about the idea. According to our theory, judicial independence exists where powerful actors are unable or unwilling to inappropriately interfere with the workings of the judiciary. Judicial independence is thus a relational concept and always results from the interplay between the capacity and willingness of powerful actors to inappropriately interfere with the judiciary, and the capacity and willingness of judicial actors and their allies to withstand such actions. We distinguish three levels of judicial independence: de jure institutional independence, de facto institutional independence, and decisional independence. Courts are thus independent when powerful actors do not consistently impose their preferences in disputes they have a stake, either by capturing the courts through formal changes of laws governing the judiciary, through rigging these laws in their favour, or by skewing judicial decision-making. By contrast, a dependent judiciary is the one that is captured, rigged or skewed.
Czech name
—
Czech description
—
Classification
Type
C - Chapter in a specialist book
CEP classification
—
OECD FORD branch
50501 - Law
Result continuities
Project
—
Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Others
Publication year
2025
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Book/collection name
The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory
ISBN
9781108491310
Number of pages of the result
17
Pages from-to
867-883
Number of pages of the book
900
Publisher name
Cambridge University Press
Place of publication
Cambridge
UT code for WoS chapter
001314168600050