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Judicial Independence

The result's identifiers

  • Result code in IS VaVaI

    <a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14220%2F25%3A00140346" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14220/25:00140346 - isvavai.cz</a>

  • Result on the web

    <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/cz/universitypress/subjects/law/constitutional-and-administrative-law/cambridge-handbook-constitutional-theory?format=HB&isbn=9781108491310" target="_blank" >https://www.cambridge.org/cz/universitypress/subjects/law/constitutional-and-administrative-law/cambridge-handbook-constitutional-theory?format=HB&isbn=9781108491310</a>

  • DOI - Digital Object Identifier

    <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781108868143" target="_blank" >10.1017/9781108868143</a>

Alternative languages

  • Result language

    angličtina

  • Original language name

    Judicial Independence

  • Original language description

    Despite being nearly universally recognised as a virtue, judicial independence has been challenged in almost all parts of the world. Some commentators even consider it to be so open to differing interpretations as to be a useless concept, that should be unpacked to its smaller components to be studied meaningfully. We are less cynical about the idea. According to our theory, judicial independence exists where powerful actors are unable or unwilling to inappropriately interfere with the workings of the judiciary. Judicial independence is thus a relational concept and always results from the interplay between the capacity and willingness of powerful actors to inappropriately interfere with the judiciary, and the capacity and willingness of judicial actors and their allies to withstand such actions. We distinguish three levels of judicial independence: de jure institutional independence, de facto institutional independence, and decisional independence. Courts are thus independent when powerful actors do not consistently impose their preferences in disputes they have a stake, either by capturing the courts through formal changes of laws governing the judiciary, through rigging these laws in their favour, or by skewing judicial decision-making. By contrast, a dependent judiciary is the one that is captured, rigged or skewed.

  • Czech name

  • Czech description

Classification

  • Type

    C - Chapter in a specialist book

  • CEP classification

  • OECD FORD branch

    50501 - Law

Result continuities

  • Project

  • Continuities

    I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Others

  • Publication year

    2025

  • Confidentiality

    S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Data specific for result type

  • Book/collection name

    The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory

  • ISBN

    9781108491310

  • Number of pages of the result

    17

  • Pages from-to

    867-883

  • Number of pages of the book

    900

  • Publisher name

    Cambridge University Press

  • Place of publication

    Cambridge

  • UT code for WoS chapter

    001314168600050