Office Allocation in the Czech Government and Chamber of Deputies in Light of Coalition Theory

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14230%2F11%3A00051917" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14230/11:00051917 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
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DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Office Allocation in the Czech Government and Chamber of Deputies in Light of Coalition Theory
Original language description
The article presented is theoretically grounded in the office-seeking approach to the study of coalitions. It takes the most influential theories of portfolio distribution in the executive and legislature (voting weights, proportionality, formateur) andtests it on the data pertaining to coalition negotiations in the Czech Republic between 1992 and 2010. We follow the distribution of portfolios in the government, in the presidium of the Chamber of Deputies, as well as in the presidiums of permanent parliamentary committees. The approach based on voting weights seems best for studying portfolio distribution in the Czech Republic, although it is not entirely satisfactory. In the theoretical discussion of the results, we also point out that the voting weights approach is somewhat less rigorous than others.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Type
J<sub>x</sub> - Unclassified - Peer-reviewed scientific article (Jimp, Jsc and Jost)
CEP classification
AD - Political sciences
OECD FORD branch
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Publication year
2011
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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