A Touch of Evil: High-Assurance Cryptographic Hardware from Untrusted Components

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14330%2F17%3A00095059" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14330/17:00095059 - isvavai.cz</a>

Result on the web

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3133961" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3133961</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3133961" target="_blank" >10.1145/3133956.3133961</a>

Result language

angličtina

Original language name

A Touch of Evil: High-Assurance Cryptographic Hardware from Untrusted Components

Original language description

The semiconductor industry is fully globalized and integrated circuits (ICs) are commonly defined, designed and fabricated in different premises across the world. This reduces production costs, but also exposes ICs to supply chain attacks, where insiders introduce malicious circuitry into the final products. Additionally, despite extensive post-fabrication testing, it is not uncommon for ICs with subtle fabrication errors to make it into production systems. While many systems may be able to tolerate a few byzantine components, this is not the case for cryptographic hardware, storing and computing on confidential data. For this reason, many error and backdoor detection techniques have been proposed over the years. So far all attempts have been either quickly circumvented, or come with unrealistically high manufacturing costs and complexity. This paper proposes Myst, a practical high-assurance architecture, that uses commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware, and provides strong security guarantees, even in the presence of multiple malicious or faulty components. The key idea is to combine protective-redundancy with modern threshold cryptographic techniques to build a system tolerant to hardware trojans and errors. To evaluate our design, we build a Hardware Security Module that provides the highest level of assurance possible with COTS components. Specifically, we employ more than a hundred COTS secure cryptocoprocessors, verified to FIPS140-2 Level 4 tamper-resistance standards, and use them to realize high-confidentiality random number generation, key derivation, public key decryption and signing. Our experiments show a reasonable computational overhead (less than 1% for both Decryption and Signing) and an exponential increase in backdoor-tolerance as more ICs are added.

Czech name

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Czech description

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Type

D - Article in proceedings

CEP classification

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OECD FORD branch

10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)

Project

<a href="/en/project/GA16-08565S" target="_blank" >GA16-08565S: Advancing cryptanalytic methods through evolutionary computing</a><br>

Continuities

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)<br>S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Publication year

2017

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Article name in the collection

CCS '17: Proceedings of the 24th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

ISBN

9781450349468

ISSN

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e-ISSN

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Number of pages

18

Pages from-to

1583-1600

Publisher name

ACM

Place of publication

Dallas, TX, USA

Event location

Dallas, TX, USA

Event date

Jan 1, 2017

Type of event by nationality

WRD - Celosvětová akce

UT code for WoS article

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