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Fooling primality tests on smartcards

The result's identifiers

  • Result code in IS VaVaI

    <a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14330%2F20%3A00114216" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14330/20:00114216 - isvavai.cz</a>

  • Result on the web

    <a href="https://crocs.fi.muni.cz/public/papers/primality_esorics20" target="_blank" >https://crocs.fi.muni.cz/public/papers/primality_esorics20</a>

  • DOI - Digital Object Identifier

    <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59013-0_11" target="_blank" >10.1007/978-3-030-59013-0_11</a>

Alternative languages

  • Result language

    angličtina

  • Original language name

    Fooling primality tests on smartcards

  • Original language description

    We analyse whether the smartcards of the JavaCard platform correctly validate primality of domain parameters. The work is inspired by Albrecht et al. (Prime and Prejudice) [1], where the authors analysed many open-source libraries and constructed pseudoprimes fooling the primality testing functions. However, in the case of smartcards, often there is no way to invoke the primality test directly, so we trigger it by replacing (EC)DSA and (EC)DH prime domain parameters by adversarial composites. Such a replacement results in vulnerability to Pohlig-Hellman [30] style attacks, leading to private key recovery. Out of nine smartcards (produced by five major manufacturers) we tested (See https://crocs.fi.muni.cz/papers/primality_esorics20 for more information), all but one have no primality test in parameter validation. As the JavaCard platform provides no public primality testing API, the problem cannot be fixed by an extra parameter check, making it difficult to mitigate in already deployed smartcards.

  • Czech name

  • Czech description

Classification

  • Type

    D - Article in proceedings

  • CEP classification

  • OECD FORD branch

    10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)

Result continuities

  • Project

    <a href="/en/project/GA20-03426S" target="_blank" >GA20-03426S: Examining and improving security of elliptic curve cryptography</a><br>

  • Continuities

    P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)<br>S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Others

  • Publication year

    2020

  • Confidentiality

    S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Data specific for result type

  • Article name in the collection

    25th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS) 2020

  • ISBN

    9783030590123

  • ISSN

    0302-9743

  • e-ISSN

  • Number of pages

    21

  • Pages from-to

    209-229

  • Publisher name

    Springer

  • Place of publication

    Švýcarsko

  • Event location

    Švýcarsko

  • Event date

    Jan 1, 2020

  • Type of event by nationality

    CST - Celostátní akce

  • UT code for WoS article