Breaking DPA-protected Kyber via the pair-pointwise multiplication
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14330%2F24%3A00135460" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14330/24:00135460 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54773-7_5" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54773-7_5</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54773-7_5" target="_blank" >10.1007/978-3-031-54773-7_5</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Breaking DPA-protected Kyber via the pair-pointwise multiplication
Original language description
We introduce a novel template attack for secret key recovery in Kyber, leveraging side-channel information from polynomial multiplication during decapsulation. Conceptually, our attack exploits that Kyber’s incomplete number-theoretic transform (NTT) causes each secret coefficient to be used multiple times, unlike when performing a complete NTT. Our attack is a single trace known ciphertext attack that avoids machine-learning techniques and instead relies on correlation-matching only. Additionally, our template generation method is very simple and easy to replicate, and we describe different attack strategies, varying on the number of templates required. Moreover, our attack applies to both masked implementations as well as designs with multiplication shuffling. We demonstrate its effectiveness by targeting a masked implementation from the mkm4 repository. We initially perform simulations in the noisy Hamming-Weight model and achieve high success rates with just 13316 templates while tolerating noise values up to σ=0.3. In a practical setup, we measure power consumption and notice that our attack falls short of expectations. However, we introduce an extension inspired by known online template attacks, enabling us to recover 128 coefficient pairs from a single polynomial multiplication. Our results provide evidence that the incomplete NTT, which is used in Kyber-768 and similar schemes, introduces an additional side-channel weakness worth further exploration.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
D - Article in proceedings
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)
Result continuities
Project
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Continuities
S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach
Others
Publication year
2024
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Article name in the collection
22nd International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security, ACNS 2024
ISBN
9783031547720
ISSN
0302-9743
e-ISSN
1611-3349
Number of pages
30
Pages from-to
101-130
Publisher name
Springer
Place of publication
Abu Dhabi
Event location
Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
Event date
Jan 1, 2024
Type of event by nationality
WRD - Celosvětová akce
UT code for WoS article
001206023700005