Comparing Competition and Regulated Monopoly in a Railway Market: An Agent-Based Modeling Approach

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F14%3A00074908" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/14:00074908 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
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DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Comparing Competition and Regulated Monopoly in a Railway Market: An Agent-Based Modeling Approach
Original language description
This paper introduces an agent-based model of a passenger railway line. The model is used for comparing the welfare of the railway market under unregulated duopoly and monopoly with maximum-price regulation. In the model, the railway operators graduallyadjust passenger fares and eliminate train departures until the market reaches steady state. The paper analyses the steady-state data generated using two sets of parameter values. It finds that for most maximum-price levels, including the price that would be chosen by an unregulated monopoly, the total welfare in the monopolistic market is significantly lower compared to the duopoly market. However, there are some levels of maximum price which produce similar or even higher welfare than the duopoly market. The paper suggests that if correctly implemented, a simple maximum-price regulation may generate welfare outcomes comparable to competition.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Publication year
2014
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Article name in the collection
Proceedings of the 18th International Conference Current Trends in Public Sector Research
ISBN
9788021066113
ISSN
2336-1239
e-ISSN
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Number of pages
6
Pages from-to
255-260
Publisher name
Masaryk University
Place of publication
Brno
Event location
Šlapanice
Event date
Jan 1, 2014
Type of event by nationality
EUR - Evropská akce
UT code for WoS article
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