Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F20%3A00114002" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/20:00114002 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6" target="_blank" >https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6" target="_blank" >10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence
Original language description
When multiple charities, social programs and community projects simultaneously vie for funding, donors risk mis-coordinating their contributions leading to an inefficient distribution of funding across projects. Community chests and other intermediary organizations facilitate coordination among donors and reduce such risks. To study this, we extend a threshold public goods framework to allow donors to contribute through an intermediary rather than directly to the public goods. Through a series of experiments, we show that the presence of an intermediary increases public good success and subjects’ earnings only when the intermediary is formally committed to direct donations to socially beneficial goods. Without such a restriction, the presence of an intermediary has a negative impact, complicating the donation environment, decreasing contributions and public good success.
Czech name
—
Czech description
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Classification
Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
—
OECD FORD branch
50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics
Result continuities
Project
<a href="/en/project/GA18-19492S" target="_blank" >GA18-19492S: The Effect of Housing Conditions on Preferences and Behavior: Lab-in-the-Field Experiments with Participants of a Randomized Controlled Trial</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Others
Publication year
2020
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
Experimental Econonomics
ISSN
1386-4157
e-ISSN
1573-6938
Volume of the periodical
23
Issue of the periodical within the volume
4
Country of publishing house
US - UNITED STATES
Number of pages
39
Pages from-to
1030-1068
UT code for WoS article
000541812600001
EID of the result in the Scopus database
2-s2.0-85076932061