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Contest and resource allocation: An experimental analysis of entitlement and self-selection effects

The result's identifiers

  • Result code in IS VaVaI

    <a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F24%3A00135755" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/24:00135755 - isvavai.cz</a>

  • Result on the web

    <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268024000284" target="_blank" >https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268024000284</a>

  • DOI - Digital Object Identifier

    <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102526" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102526</a>

Alternative languages

  • Result language

    angličtina

  • Original language name

    Contest and resource allocation: An experimental analysis of entitlement and self-selection effects

  • Original language description

    Leaders who decide the allocation of resources are often chosen through contests. Due to imperfect monitoring, they often decide to allocate resources to themselves at the expense of others. This paper investigates how being selected in a contest affects such allocation through two channels: entitlement and self-selection effects. In our experiment, two players compete for the right to allocate resources between themself and a third, uninvolved player. We identify the entitlement effects by comparing the choices of participants who participated in the contest with those who were chosen randomly. Self-selection effect is identified by comparing the choices of winners and losers between treatments via a difference-in-difference approach. We find a significant effect of entitlement; people participating in the contest transfer fewer resources to the third player compared to those who did not participate. Further, we find no evidence that the people with specific distributional preferences self-select into the leaders’ role. Our findings suggest that the primary reason leaders allocate resources to themselves is their involvement in the contest rather than being a result of self-selection.

  • Czech name

  • Czech description

Classification

  • Type

    J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database

  • CEP classification

  • OECD FORD branch

    50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics

Result continuities

  • Project

    Result was created during the realization of more than one project. More information in the Projects tab.

  • Continuities

    P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Others

  • Publication year

    2024

  • Confidentiality

    S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Data specific for result type

  • Name of the periodical

    EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

  • ISSN

    0176-2680

  • e-ISSN

    1873-5703

  • Volume of the periodical

    82

  • Issue of the periodical within the volume

    March

  • Country of publishing house

    NL - THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS

  • Number of pages

    10

  • Pages from-to

    1-10

  • UT code for WoS article

    001220212100001

  • EID of the result in the Scopus database

    2-s2.0-85189520479