Contest and resource allocation: An experimental analysis of entitlement and self-selection effects
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F24%3A00135755" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/24:00135755 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268024000284" target="_blank" >https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268024000284</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102526" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102526</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Contest and resource allocation: An experimental analysis of entitlement and self-selection effects
Original language description
Leaders who decide the allocation of resources are often chosen through contests. Due to imperfect monitoring, they often decide to allocate resources to themselves at the expense of others. This paper investigates how being selected in a contest affects such allocation through two channels: entitlement and self-selection effects. In our experiment, two players compete for the right to allocate resources between themself and a third, uninvolved player. We identify the entitlement effects by comparing the choices of participants who participated in the contest with those who were chosen randomly. Self-selection effect is identified by comparing the choices of winners and losers between treatments via a difference-in-difference approach. We find a significant effect of entitlement; people participating in the contest transfer fewer resources to the third player compared to those who did not participate. Further, we find no evidence that the people with specific distributional preferences self-select into the leaders’ role. Our findings suggest that the primary reason leaders allocate resources to themselves is their involvement in the contest rather than being a result of self-selection.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics
Result continuities
Project
Result was created during the realization of more than one project. More information in the Projects tab.
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Others
Publication year
2024
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
ISSN
0176-2680
e-ISSN
1873-5703
Volume of the periodical
82
Issue of the periodical within the volume
March
Country of publishing house
NL - THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS
Number of pages
10
Pages from-to
1-10
UT code for WoS article
001220212100001
EID of the result in the Scopus database
2-s2.0-85189520479