Designing Donation Incentive Contracts for Online Gig Workers

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F24%3A00139311" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/24:00139311 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10551-023-05428-7" target="_blank" >https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10551-023-05428-7</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-023-05428-7" target="_blank" >10.1007/s10551-023-05428-7</a>

Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Designing Donation Incentive Contracts for Online Gig Workers
Original language description
This study examines the effects of donation incentives on labor supply in an online labor market through a field experiment (n = 944). We manipulate the donation purpose of the incentive to be either unifying or polarizing and the size of the donation relative to the workers’ wage. Our experimental design allows us to observe the decision to accept a job (extensive margin) and different dimensions of productivity (intensive margin). We predict and show that a unifying donation purpose attracts more gig workers and improves their productivity compared to a polarizing donation purpose. We discuss the implications of these results in order to understand the role of donation incentives and labor supply in online labor markets.
Czech name
—
Czech description
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Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
—
OECD FORD branch
50200 - Economics and Business

Project
<a href="/en/project/GA20-06785S" target="_blank" >GA20-06785S: Experimental analysis of multiple public goods funding dilemmas</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Publication year
2024
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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