The hidden costs of imposing minimum contributions to a global public good
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F25%3A00140333" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/25:00140333 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092180092400243X" target="_blank" >https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092180092400243X</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2024.108346" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.ecolecon.2024.108346</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
The hidden costs of imposing minimum contributions to a global public good
Original language description
We study how different types of individuals respond to being forced to make a minimum contribution to a global public good. Participants in our experiment decide how much of their endowment to contribute towards offsetting CO2 emissions. We elicit their contributions when they are free to spend any amount of their endowment on carbon offsets and when they are forced to spend a certain minimum amount on it. We find that those who contribute more than the minimum before it is imposed contribute less overall once the minimum comes into effect. This is true for both a low and a high level of the minimum and appears to be driven in part by pessimistic beliefs about the contributions of others. We show that the lower minimum also reduces overall contributions relative to a situation with no minimum. We do not find evidence that having the level of the minimum determined through a majority vote rather than an exogenous procedure has any material impact on these results.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
50200 - Economics and Business
Result continuities
Project
Result was created during the realization of more than one project. More information in the Projects tab.
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Others
Publication year
2025
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS
ISSN
0921-8009
e-ISSN
1873-6106
Volume of the periodical
227
Issue of the periodical within the volume
January
Country of publishing house
NL - THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS
Number of pages
20
Pages from-to
1-20
UT code for WoS article
001308248700001
EID of the result in the Scopus database
2-s2.0-85202962948