The role of generalised reciprocity and reciprocal tendencies in the emergence of cooperative group norms

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14740%2F22%3A00127082" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14740/22:00127082 - isvavai.cz</a>

Result on the web

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2022.102520" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2022.102520</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2022.102520" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.joep.2022.102520</a>

Result language

angličtina

Original language name

The role of generalised reciprocity and reciprocal tendencies in the emergence of cooperative group norms

Original language description

Norms for cooperation are essential for groups to function effectively, yet there are often strong incentives for group members to behave selfishly. Direct and indirect reciprocity can help to discourage such uncooperative behaviour by punishing defectors and rewarding cooperators, but require explicit means for punishment and tally-keeping. What, then, encourages an individual to cooperate with their group when others cannot track the behaviour of others? We adapted the Bargaining Game to examine the emergence and maintenance of cooperation among 20 groups of six anonymous players (N = 120) who interacted amongst themselves over recursive bargaining exchanges. By estimating the expected utility that drives players’ demands in these interactions, we demonstrate that their behaviour on each exchange reflects the demands placed upon them previously. Thus, we highlight the role of generalised reciprocity in such situations; that is, when an individual passes on to another member of their group the behaviour they have received previously. Furthermore, we identify four distinct behavioural types that differ in their expressions of generalised reciprocity: Some players converge quickly on cooperative demands regardless of the behaviour they received from their co-players, and are therefore characterised by low expressions of reciprocity. In contrast, individuals with strong reciprocal tendencies decrease their demands over successive interactions in response to the behaviour of their group. By simulating groups with different compositions of these player types, we reveal the strong influence of individual differences in reciprocal tendencies on the emergence of cooperative group dynamics.

Czech name

—

Czech description

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Type

J_imp - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database

CEP classification

—

OECD FORD branch

50101 - Psychology (including human - machine relations)

Project

<a href="/en/project/GA18-21791S" target="_blank" >GA18-21791S: Back and Forth: Investigating the balance between self and other goals in negotiation with fMRI hyperscanning</a><br>

Continuities

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)<br>I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year

2022

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Name of the periodical

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY

ISSN

0167-4870

e-ISSN

1872-7719

Volume of the periodical

90

Issue of the periodical within the volume

June

Country of publishing house

NL - THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS

Number of pages

13

Pages from-to

1-13

UT code for WoS article

000786690100003

EID of the result in the Scopus database

2-s2.0-85127362727