Clarification of Discrepancies in the Classification of 1oo2 and 2oo2 Architectures Used for Safety Integrity in Land Transport

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216275%3A25530%2F21%3A39918458" target="_blank" >RIV/00216275:25530/21:39918458 - isvavai.cz</a>

Result on the web

<a href="https://cmswebonline.com/esrel2021-epro/html/052.xml" target="_blank" >https://cmswebonline.com/esrel2021-epro/html/052.xml</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.3850/978-981-18-2016-8_052-cd" target="_blank" >10.3850/978-981-18-2016-8_052-cd</a>

Result language

angličtina

Original language name

Clarification of Discrepancies in the Classification of 1oo2 and 2oo2 Architectures Used for Safety Integrity in Land Transport

Original language description

Automated car driving or advanced railway signaling systems are based on the safe vehicle position determination. The required safety integrity of the positioning function cannot be achieved using a single element, and therefore a combination of information from several diverse sensors should be used – e.g. within the 1oo2 (one-out-of-two) or 2oo2 (two-out-of-two) architecture. The standard IEC 61508 says that the 1oo2 architecture is intended for safety integrity and 2oo2 for availability. On the other hand, the railway standard EN 50129 says that 2oo2 is used for integrity – quite the opposite. So where is the truth? The purpose of the contribution is to clarify the above discrepancies. The paper begins with the classification of safety systems as ‘safety-critical’ and ‘safety-related’ and examines the possible impact of system classification on system properties depending on the area of application. Then, the basic safety parameters of dualchannel architectures for safety integrity are presented using two examples with Markov modelling. The main differences between 1oo2 and 2oo2 architectures used for safety integrity are explained. Finally, the equations concerning the safety parameters contained in the automotive standard ISO 26262-10 for a dual-channel architecture are verified using rail safety experience. Recommendations for the safety architecture design for self-driving cars are given, which are based on the numerical results obtained in the examples.

Czech name

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Czech description

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Type

D - Article in proceedings

CEP classification

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OECD FORD branch

20202 - Communication engineering and systems

Project

<a href="/en/project/EF17_049%2F0008394" target="_blank" >EF17_049/0008394: Cooperation in Applied Research between the University of Pardubice and companies, in the Field of Positioning, Detection and Simulation Technology for Transport Systems (PosiTrans)</a><br>

Continuities

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Publication year

2021

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Article name in the collection

Proceedings of the 31st European Safety and Reliability Conference

ISBN

978-981-18201-6-8

ISSN

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e-ISSN

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Number of pages

8

Pages from-to

1272-1279

Publisher name

Research Publishing Services

Place of publication

Singapore

Event location

Angers

Event date

Sep 19, 2021

Type of event by nationality

WRD - Celosvětová akce

UT code for WoS article

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