Crucial pitfall of DPA Contest V4.2 Implementation

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216305%3A26220%2F17%3APU123794" target="_blank" >RIV/00216305:26220/17:PU123794 - isvavai.cz</a>

Result on the web

<a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/sec.1760/full" target="_blank" >http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/sec.1760/full</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/sec.1760" target="_blank" >10.1002/sec.1760</a>

Result language

angličtina

Original language name

Crucial pitfall of DPA Contest V4.2 Implementation

Original language description

Differential Power Analysis (DPA) is a powerful side-channel key recovery attack that efficiently breaks cryptographic algorithm implementations. In order to prevent these types of attacks, hardware designers and software programmers make use of masking and hiding techniques. DPA Contest is an international framework that allows researchers to compare their power analysis attacks under the same conditions. The latest version of DPA Contest, denoted as V4.2, provides an improved implementation of the Rotating Sbox Masking (RSM) scheme where low-entropy boolean masking is combined with the shuffling technique to protect AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) implementation on a smart card. The improvements were designed based on the awareness of implementation lacks analyzed from attacks carried out during the previous DPA Contest V4. Therefore, this new approach is devised to resist most of the proposed attacks to the original RSM implementation. In this article, we investigate the security of this new implementation in practice. Our analysis, focused on exploiting the first-order leakage, discovered important lacks. The main vulnerability observed is that an adversary can mount a standard DPA attack aimed at the S-box output in order to recover the whole secret key even when a shuffling technique is used. We tested this observation on a public dataset and implemented a successful attack that revealed the secret key using only 35 power traces.

Czech name

—

Czech description

—

Type

J_imp - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database

CEP classification

—

OECD FORD branch

20201 - Electrical and electronic engineering

Project

<a href="/en/project/LO1401" target="_blank" >LO1401: Interdisciplinary Research of Wireless Technologies</a><br>

Continuities

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)<br>S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Publication year

2017

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Name of the periodical

Security and Communication Networks (online)

ISSN

1939-0114

e-ISSN

1939-0122

Volume of the periodical

9

Issue of the periodical within the volume

18

Country of publishing house

GB - UNITED KINGDOM

Number of pages

17

Pages from-to

1-17

UT code for WoS article

000398221800092

EID of the result in the Scopus database

2-s2.0-85016609370