Productive of the service sector: theory and practice of corruption declining

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F04274644%3A_____%2F19%3A%230000547" target="_blank" >RIV/04274644:_____/19:#0000547 - isvavai.cz</a>

Result on the web

<a href="http://mmi.fem.sumdu.edu.ua/en/journals/2019/4/269-279" target="_blank" >http://mmi.fem.sumdu.edu.ua/en/journals/2019/4/269-279</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.21272/mmi.2019.4-21" target="_blank" >10.21272/mmi.2019.4-21</a>

Result language

angličtina

Original language name

Productive of the service sector: theory and practice of corruption declining

Original language description

Corruption contracts are, throughout the democratic world, illegal and considered immoral. Their participants thus cannot use standard procedures to find a second party, to negotiate the content of the contract, to check if it performs what was promised, and to enforce the promises. This increases the risks associated with the contract. Illegality or immorality of the contract makes both parties more vulnerable – each party can threaten to reveal the contract and denounce the second party. Connecting a corruption contract with a previously established legal contract is usually seen as the best way to reduce risks and to reinforce the corruption contract. Owing to legal contacts and contracts, potential parties interested in corruption know where they should seek a counterparty and what to offer. At the same time, the corruption contract is tied to legal contracts, and failure to fulfil conditions of the corruption contract may put such legal contract at risk, therefore there is a higher probability that both parties to the corruption contract would fulfil what was promised and that there will be no extortion by any of the parties to demand additional fulfilment after the end of the corruption contract or that the corruption contract will not be disclosed. This paper presents the opposite approach in which a corruption contract is established as the first and it creates the base for further often legal but immoral contracts. All contracts lead to the mutually advantageous affinity of all its participants who often become members of corruption networks. The article presents the model when a blackmailed or dependent person must participate in corruption contracts, otherwise, it faces serious problems. But sooner or later, participation will begin to bring him benefits, so he becomes dependent on the network, although initially, he had moral inhibitions to participate in its activities. The subjects looking a counterparty of the corruption contract thus often create the environment of dependency and blackmailing and when people that are obliged to corruption lose their scruples and they see corruption as the common behaviour. Our model comes from real corruption networks in the Czech Republic. Some of them are briefly analysed. Theory of corruption must pay higher attention to all factors contributing to the spread of corruption behaviour, including mutual dependence and extortion.

Czech name

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Czech description

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Type

J_imp - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database

CEP classification

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OECD FORD branch

50201 - Economic Theory

Project

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Continuities

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Publication year

2019

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Name of the periodical

Marketing and Management of Innovations

ISSN

2227-6718

e-ISSN

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Volume of the periodical

9

Issue of the periodical within the volume

4

Country of publishing house

UA - UKRAINE

Number of pages

11

Pages from-to

269-279

UT code for WoS article

000504921700021

EID of the result in the Scopus database

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