POSITIONAL INVESTING AND THE MECHANISMS OF A DYNAMIC SOCIETY

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F04274644%3A_____%2F25%3A%230001204" target="_blank" >RIV/04274644:_____/25:#0001204 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://doi.org/10.60797/ECNMS.2025.8.2" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.60797/ECNMS.2025.8.2</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.60797/ECNMS.2025.8.2" target="_blank" >10.60797/ECNMS.2025.8.2</a>

Result language
angličtina
Original language name
POSITIONAL INVESTING AND THE MECHANISMS OF A DYNAMIC SOCIETY
Original language description
The comprehensive reforms needed to enhance innovation potential, change the nature of economic growth, and fully exploit the potential of artificial intelligence require designing and enforcing mechanisms in the sense of Hurwicz, Myerson, and Trockel. Their concepts are based on game theory, including Nash's bargaining problem. We interpret the above problem using a financial market model conceived as supply and demand of investment funds and investment opportunities, identify the phenomenon of positional investing and refine the theoretical tools of its analysis. We show the contribution but also the limitations of the role of positional investment theory to address the issue of the explicitness of the proposed mechanisms and the limitations of the role of external authority in their institutional provision.
Czech name
—
Czech description
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Publication year
2025
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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