All

What are you looking for?

All
Projects
Results
Organizations

Quick search

  • Projects supported by TA ČR
  • Excellent projects
  • Projects with the highest public support
  • Current projects

Smart search

  • That is how I find a specific +word
  • That is how I leave the -word out of the results
  • “That is how I can find the whole phrase”

Mechanisms of Secularization: Testing Between the Rationalization and Existential Insecurity Theories

The result's identifiers

  • Result code in IS VaVaI

    <a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F25840886%3A_____%2F24%3AN0000015" target="_blank" >RIV/25840886:_____/24:N0000015 - isvavai.cz</a>

  • Result on the web

    <a href="https://online.ucpress.edu/collabra/article/10/1/126508/204054/Mechanisms-of-Secularization-Testing-Between-the" target="_blank" >https://online.ucpress.edu/collabra/article/10/1/126508/204054/Mechanisms-of-Secularization-Testing-Between-the</a>

  • DOI - Digital Object Identifier

    <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/collabra.126508" target="_blank" >10.1525/collabra.126508</a>

Alternative languages

  • Result language

    angličtina

  • Original language name

    Mechanisms of Secularization: Testing Between the Rationalization and Existential Insecurity Theories

  • Original language description

    The study tests two competing explanations of the secularization process related to rationalizing worldviews and decreasing existential insecurity. While the former explanation argues that people are unwilling to join religious groups because of increasing mechanistic understanding of the world that clashes with religious views (and is rather irreversible), the latter argues that it is the decreasing insecurity that causes secularization and that this trend can be reversed with increasing insecurity. In the present study, 811 secular participants from the USA and Poland played a modified version of the Nash demand game, which simulates dilemmas indexing cooperative insecurity. Participants were randomly assigned to either a secure or insecure environment, manipulated by the parameters of the Nash demand game, and we assessed whether they would be willing to join costly normative groups that regulate cooperation in the game. Crucially, participants were randomly assigned either to a secular condition (choosing between a secular normative group and a group with no norms)—our manipulation check—or a religious condition (choosing between a normative group with religious framing and a group without norms)—main test between the two theories. The results showed that participants in the secular condition were more likely to choose the normative group in the insecure compared to the secure environment, but this difference was inconclusive in the religious condition. However, when re-assigning participants from insecure to secure environments and vice versa, we found strong support for the existential insecurity theory. We discuss potential explanations for the discrepancy between stated and actual behavior as well as potential motivations for joining religious normative groups. This submission has been positively recommended by PCI RR.

  • Czech name

  • Czech description

Classification

  • Type

    J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database

  • CEP classification

  • OECD FORD branch

    50101 - Psychology (including human - machine relations)

Result continuities

  • Project

  • Continuities

    N - Vyzkumna aktivita podporovana z neverejnych zdroju

Others

  • Publication year

    2024

  • Confidentiality

    S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Data specific for result type

  • Name of the periodical

    Collabra: Psychology

  • ISSN

  • e-ISSN

    2474-7394

  • Volume of the periodical

    10

  • Issue of the periodical within the volume

    1

  • Country of publishing house

    US - UNITED STATES

  • Number of pages

    17

  • Pages from-to

    1-17

  • UT code for WoS article

    001379322900001

  • EID of the result in the Scopus database

    2-s2.0-85213052815