Explaining the persistence of defense offsets in a supply-driven arms trade

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F26482789%3A_____%2F26%3A10152860" target="_blank" >RIV/26482789:_____/26:10152860 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10242694.2025.2490168?scroll=top&needAccess=true" target="_blank" >https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10242694.2025.2490168?scroll=top&needAccess=true</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2025.2490168" target="_blank" >10.1080/10242694.2025.2490168</a>

Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Explaining the persistence of defense offsets in a supply-driven arms trade
Original language description
Historically, defense offsets have been viewed as a feature of buyer-driven markets, where surplus supply of weapons gives buyer states the leverage to demand additional industrial and technological benefits from foreign suppliers. However, in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the global arms trade has shifted to a supply-driven market, where demand outstrips supply. Despite this shift, countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have continued to prioritize offsets, even though their bargaining power has diminished. This paper seeks to explain this apparent paradox through an inductive research design and qualitative methods, ultimately proposing a new theoretical framework based on three key factors: the growing drive for self-sufficiency, the strategic importance of government-to-government relationships, and the long-term planning horizons associated with defense procurement in the region. By analyzing recent offset agreements in CEE, it demonstrates how these factors collectively sustain offset demands – even in a supply-constrained market – while also providing insights into broader dynamics in global defense trade as well as arms collaboration.
Czech name
—
Czech description
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Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
50601 - Political science

Publication year
2026
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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