Incentive Effect of Heterogeneity on Performancein Esports

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F44555601%3A13510%2F25%3A43899225" target="_blank" >RIV/44555601:13510/25:43899225 - isvavai.cz</a>

Alternative codes found

RIV/61384399:31140/25:00061472 RIV/61384399:31150/25:00061472

Result on the web

<a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/mde.70018" target="_blank" >https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/mde.70018</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/mde.70018" target="_blank" >10.1002/mde.70018</a>

Result language

angličtina

Original language name

Incentive Effect of Heterogeneity on Performancein Esports

Original language description

Tournament theory posits that ex-ante known heterogeneity in abilities can diminish the effort exerted by participants, leading toreduced overall performance. This article empirically tests this prediction within the context of professional esports, specificallyusing comprehensive data from the entire competitive history of Counter- Strike: Global Offensive. The analysis is conducted atboth team and player levels, employing generalized additive mixed-effects models and utilizing three distinct proxy variablesfor team performance. The findings consistently reveal a negative incentive effect of ex-ante known ability heterogeneity onperformance. Teams and players perform worse when ability differences are apparent before the match. While the directionand statistical significance of this effect remain stable across alternative model specifications, robustness checks reveal that itssize can vary depending on model assumptions. These findings confirm tournament theory&apos;s predictions in a digital competitiveenvironment.

Czech name

—

Czech description

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Type

J_imp - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database

CEP classification

—

OECD FORD branch

50204 - Business and management

Project

—

Continuities

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year

2025

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Name of the periodical

Managerial and Decision Economics

ISSN

0143-6570

e-ISSN

1099-1468

Volume of the periodical

46

Issue of the periodical within the volume

8

Country of publishing house

GB - UNITED KINGDOM

Number of pages

12

Pages from-to

1-12

UT code for WoS article

001563572300001

EID of the result in the Scopus database

2-s2.0-105014624554