Transparency of Lobbying: a Theoretical Approach

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F46747885%3A24310%2F16%3A00000882" target="_blank" >RIV/46747885:24310/16:00000882 - isvavai.cz</a>

Result on the web

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Result language

angličtina

Original language name

Transparency of Lobbying: a Theoretical Approach

Original language description

The aim of this article is to study the links among government, lobbyists, businesses, and citizens in terms of information flows and to design a preliminary model of such links and identify possible consequences. The basic tradable good on political markets is information. Here information acts as goods which serve entities to promote their own interests. The promotion of interests and the information market are therefore the basic factors which are to be the subject of study and discussion in the following considerations. The state is a bureaucratic institution, determines the rules of the game and in non-market decision making obtains information, partially from its own sources and partially from other stakeholders. The opportunity thereby presents itself for stakeholders to influence the government's decision making and bureaucratic apparatus. The entire process can be carried out without transparency and without rules, where companies use lobbying to seek rent from the state as a consequence of high information asymmetry. This situation also brings a high level of uncertainty to all stakeholders, as insiders can become outsiders at virtually any time. If decision-makers wished to behave responsibly in this situation, they would have to trace the necessary information themselves – an attempt at perfect awareness. Although this could increase the quality of a decision, such a decision would likely be accompanied by high additional costs and time demands for obtaining such information and the risk of an adverse selection can certainly not be ruled out. In the transparent environment in which effective rules are established, the risk of information asymmetry (as well as the costs associated with additional rent) and uncertainty are reduced.

Czech name

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Czech description

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Type

D - Article in proceedings

CEP classification

AH - Economics

OECD FORD branch

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Project

<a href="/en/project/GA16-08786S" target="_blank" >GA16-08786S: Impact of Transparency of Lobbying on Democratization and Its Consequences</a><br>

Continuities

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Publication year

2016

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Article name in the collection

Proceedings of 14th International Conference Economic Policy in the European Union Member Countries

ISBN

978-80-7510-210-2

ISSN

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e-ISSN

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Number of pages

10

Pages from-to

368-377

Publisher name

Silesian Univerzity

Place of publication

Karviná

Event location

Petrovice u Karviné

Event date

Jan 1, 2016

Type of event by nationality

EUR - Evropská akce

UT code for WoS article

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