Advertising cooperative phenotype through costly signals facilitates collective action

Result code in IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F46747885%3A24510%2F22%3A00010795" target="_blank" >RIV/46747885:24510/22:00010795 - isvavai.cz</a>

Alternative codes found

RIV/00216224:14210/22:00125962 RIV/25840886:_____/22:N0000004

Result on the web

<a href="https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsos.202202" target="_blank" >https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsos.202202</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.202202" target="_blank" >10.1098/rsos.202202</a>

Result language

angličtina

Original language name

Advertising cooperative phenotype through costly signals facilitates collective action

Original language description

Around the world, people engage in practices that involve self-inflicted pain and apparently wasted resources. Researchers theorized that these practices help stabilize within-group cooperation by assorting individuals committed to collective action. While this proposition was previously studied using existing religious practices, we provide a controlled framework for an experimental investigation of various predictions derived from this theory. We recruited 372 university students in the Czech Republic who were randomly assigned into either a high-cost or low-cost condition and then chose to play a public goods game (PGG) either in a group that wastes money to signal commitment to high contributions in the game or to play in the group without such signals. We predicted that cooperators would assort in the high-cost revealed group and that, despite these costs, they would contribute more to the common pool and earn larger individual rewards over five iterations of PGG compared with the concealed group and participants in the low-cost condition. The results showed that the assortment of cooperators was more effective in the high-cost condition and translated into larger contributions of the remaining endowment to the common pool, but participants in the low-cost revealed group earned the most. We conclude that costly signals can serve as an imperfect assorting mechanism, but the size of the costs needs to be carefully balanced with potential benefits to be profitable.

Czech name

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Czech description

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Type

J_imp - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database

CEP classification

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OECD FORD branch

10700 - Other natural sciences

Project

Result was created during the realization of more than one project. More information in the Projects tab.

Continuities

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year

2022

Confidentiality

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Name of the periodical

Royal Society Open Science

ISSN

2054-5703

e-ISSN

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Volume of the periodical

9

Issue of the periodical within the volume

5

Country of publishing house

GB - UNITED KINGDOM

Number of pages

19

Pages from-to

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UT code for WoS article

000800401100004

EID of the result in the Scopus database

2-s2.0-85130951361