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Hacking the Least Trusted Node: Indirect Eavesdropping in Quantum Networks

The result's identifiers

  • Result code in IS VaVaI

    <a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61989100%3A27240%2F24%3A10256062" target="_blank" >RIV/61989100:27240/24:10256062 - isvavai.cz</a>

  • Alternative codes found

    RIV/61989100:27740/24:10256062

  • Result on the web

    <a href="https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10741278" target="_blank" >https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10741278</a>

  • DOI - Digital Object Identifier

    <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2024.3490378" target="_blank" >10.1109/ACCESS.2024.3490378</a>

Alternative languages

  • Result language

    angličtina

  • Original language name

    Hacking the Least Trusted Node: Indirect Eavesdropping in Quantum Networks

  • Original language description

    We study the significance of the common trusted relay assumption in quantum networks. While most practical implementations of quantum networks rely on trusted devices, the question of security without this assumption has been rarely addressed. Device independent security attempts to minimize the assumptions made on the quantum hardware, entanglement based methods try to avoid relays to the extent possible, and multipath transmission improves robustness and security by enforcing the attacker to conquer more than just a single intermediate node. Common to all these past studies is their focus on the physical layer and direct connections. We describe an attack from the networking and routing layer. Assuming at least one node that is not perfectly tamper-proof, meaning that an attacker has established a foothold to read traffic from the inside, we show how to exploit the eavesdropping detection mechanisms of the quantum key distribution (QKD) devices to cause traffic redirection over the vulnerable node, thus defeating security under the trusted node assumption. We experimentally demonstrate how the attack works on networks of different size and topology, and thereby further substantiate the significance of the trust assumptions for end-to-end security of QKD networks.

  • Czech name

  • Czech description

Classification

  • Type

    J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database

  • CEP classification

  • OECD FORD branch

    20203 - Telecommunications

Result continuities

  • Project

    <a href="/en/project/VJ01010008" target="_blank" >VJ01010008: Network Cybersecurity in Post-Quantum Era</a><br>

  • Continuities

    P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Others

  • Publication year

    2024

  • Confidentiality

    S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Data specific for result type

  • Name of the periodical

    IEEE Access

  • ISSN

    2169-3536

  • e-ISSN

  • Volume of the periodical

    12

  • Issue of the periodical within the volume

    November

  • Country of publishing house

    US - UNITED STATES

  • Number of pages

    9

  • Pages from-to

    160973-160981

  • UT code for WoS article

    001349777300001

  • EID of the result in the Scopus database