Hacking the Least Trusted Node: Indirect Eavesdropping in Quantum Networks
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61989100%3A27240%2F24%3A10256062" target="_blank" >RIV/61989100:27240/24:10256062 - isvavai.cz</a>
Alternative codes found
RIV/61989100:27740/24:10256062
Result on the web
<a href="https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10741278" target="_blank" >https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10741278</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2024.3490378" target="_blank" >10.1109/ACCESS.2024.3490378</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Hacking the Least Trusted Node: Indirect Eavesdropping in Quantum Networks
Original language description
We study the significance of the common trusted relay assumption in quantum networks. While most practical implementations of quantum networks rely on trusted devices, the question of security without this assumption has been rarely addressed. Device independent security attempts to minimize the assumptions made on the quantum hardware, entanglement based methods try to avoid relays to the extent possible, and multipath transmission improves robustness and security by enforcing the attacker to conquer more than just a single intermediate node. Common to all these past studies is their focus on the physical layer and direct connections. We describe an attack from the networking and routing layer. Assuming at least one node that is not perfectly tamper-proof, meaning that an attacker has established a foothold to read traffic from the inside, we show how to exploit the eavesdropping detection mechanisms of the quantum key distribution (QKD) devices to cause traffic redirection over the vulnerable node, thus defeating security under the trusted node assumption. We experimentally demonstrate how the attack works on networks of different size and topology, and thereby further substantiate the significance of the trust assumptions for end-to-end security of QKD networks.
Czech name
—
Czech description
—
Classification
Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
—
OECD FORD branch
20203 - Telecommunications
Result continuities
Project
<a href="/en/project/VJ01010008" target="_blank" >VJ01010008: Network Cybersecurity in Post-Quantum Era</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Others
Publication year
2024
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
IEEE Access
ISSN
2169-3536
e-ISSN
—
Volume of the periodical
12
Issue of the periodical within the volume
November
Country of publishing house
US - UNITED STATES
Number of pages
9
Pages from-to
160973-160981
UT code for WoS article
001349777300001
EID of the result in the Scopus database
—