Role Swap: When the Follower Leads and the Leader Follows
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61989100%3A27510%2F21%3A10248425" target="_blank" >RIV/61989100:27510/21:10248425 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://journal.fsv.cuni.cz/mag/article/show/id/1491" target="_blank" >https://journal.fsv.cuni.cz/mag/article/show/id/1491</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.32065/CJEF.2021.04.02" target="_blank" >10.32065/CJEF.2021.04.02</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Role Swap: When the Follower Leads and the Leader Follows
Original language description
The game theoretic literature has commonly explored circumstances in which the players are identical. In the real world, strategic actors such as competing firms or political parties are however heterogeneous. Most importantly, their payoffs across the various possible outcomes generally differ. We consider payoff heterogeneity within a more general 'Stochastic leadership' framework. It allows for probabilistic revisions of each player's initial actions - upon observing what the others have done. The analysis shows that under Stochastic leadership it is the exact payoffs, not just their ranking, that affects the set of (subgame-perfect) equilibria. This is consistent with experimental studies that show payoff heterogeneity to hinder cooperation and aggravate conflict by moving the players away from the focal (symmetric/equitable) outcome. Furthermore, we demonstrate that if the payoffs are sufficiently asymmetric the players may essentially swap their roles in coordination and anti-coordination games. In particular, we derive circumstances within the Battle of the sexes, Stag hunt and Hawk and dove games under which the Stochastic follower (the more flexible player with a higher revision probability) starts behaving as the Stackelberg leader. Our main real-world example is from the area of climate change agreements between major countries.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
50201 - Economic Theory
Result continuities
Project
<a href="/en/project/GA19-19485S" target="_blank" >GA19-19485S: Spatial Dynamics and Inequality: The Role of Connectivity and Access to Finance</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Others
Publication year
2021
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance
ISSN
0015-1920
e-ISSN
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Volume of the periodical
71
Issue of the periodical within the volume
4
Country of publishing house
CZ - CZECH REPUBLIC
Number of pages
24
Pages from-to
282-305
UT code for WoS article
000739835800003
EID of the result in the Scopus database
2-s2.0-85122098526