Green subsidies as strategic trade policy tools
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61989100%3A27510%2F24%3A10254948" target="_blank" >RIV/61989100:27510/24:10254948 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10018-024-00404-5" target="_blank" >https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10018-024-00404-5</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10018-024-00404-5" target="_blank" >10.1007/s10018-024-00404-5</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Green subsidies as strategic trade policy tools
Original language description
In a third-country market model in which two export countries adopt environmental policies (taxes and subsidies), this article analyses how an abatement ("green") subsidy can become a potential strategic trade policy tool. When governments set the optimal policy considering their local environmental damages, a rich set of equilibria arises. In contrast to the standard result, it is shown that subsidising pollution abatement can 1) emerge as the unique Pareto-efficient Nash equilibrium of the policy game, 2) be the only feasible environmental policy when environmental awareness is low, irrespective of the efficiency of the cleaning technology, and 3) emerge as the unique Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium of the policy game at the end of the ecological transition. The article also tackles some dynamic issues that the policy game implies. (C) The Author(s) 2024.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
J<sub>imp</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the Web of Science database
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics
Result continuities
Project
<a href="/en/project/GA23-06282S" target="_blank" >GA23-06282S: Evolutionary economic dynamics with finite populations: Modeling and applications</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Others
Publication year
2024
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
Environmental Economics and Policy Studies
ISSN
1432-847X
e-ISSN
1867-383X
Volume of the periodical
26
Issue of the periodical within the volume
4
Country of publishing house
US - UNITED STATES
Number of pages
17
Pages from-to
741-757
UT code for WoS article
001234024100001
EID of the result in the Scopus database
2-s2.0-85194481310