Revisiting Husserl’s Concept of Leib Using Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61989592%3A15210%2F21%3A73608410" target="_blank" >RIV/61989592:15210/21:73608410 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjp.12416" target="_blank" >https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjp.12416</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/SJP.12416" target="_blank" >10.1111/SJP.12416</a>
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Revisiting Husserl’s Concept of Leib Using Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology
Original language description
This article reconsiders Husserl’s concept of Leib in light of Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of the human body as an ontologically significant phenomenon. I first analyze Husserl’s account of the body as a “two-fold unity” and demonstrate the problematic nature of its four implications, namely, the ambiguous ontological status of the body as subject-object, the view of “my body” as “my object,” the preconstitutive character of the unity of the body, and the restriction of the constitution of the body to touch alone. Building on this analysis, I explain how Merleau-Ponty resolves the difficulties raised by Husserl’s account by reversing it. According to Merleau-Ponty, “flesh” is not a two-fold reality comprising subjective and objective aspects, but an ontological dimension from which these aspects can be abstracted through specific cognitive operations. Consequently, all subjective and objective aspects, even beyond the boundaries of one’s body, must be understood as founded in the indivisible unity of flesh. I argue that a thorough phenomenological description of the human body requires abandoning Husserl’s concept of Leib because it contributes to perpetuating subject-object dualism. In contrast, Merleau-Ponty’s notion of flesh reveals the circularity between subject and object and its general ontological significance.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Classification
Type
J<sub>SC</sub> - Article in a specialist periodical, which is included in the SCOPUS database
CEP classification
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OECD FORD branch
60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Result continuities
Project
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Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Others
Publication year
2021
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Name of the periodical
SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
ISSN
0038-4283
e-ISSN
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Volume of the periodical
59
Issue of the periodical within the volume
3
Country of publishing house
US - UNITED STATES
Number of pages
33
Pages from-to
309-341
UT code for WoS article
000645898700001
EID of the result in the Scopus database
2-s2.0-85105085814