Does EU market abuse regulation create sufficient deterrence from financial crimes in the form of insider dealing?: Using the example of Germany

Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62156489%3A43110%2F18%3A43913707" target="_blank" >RIV/62156489:43110/18:43913707 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
<a href="http://pefnet.mendelu.cz/wcd/w-rek-pefnet/pefnet17_fin.pdf" target="_blank" >http://pefnet.mendelu.cz/wcd/w-rek-pefnet/pefnet17_fin.pdf</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Does EU market abuse regulation create sufficient deterrence from financial crimes in the form of insider dealing?: Using the example of Germany
Original language description
EU regulators and legislators have introduced numerous new requirements after the financial crisis in 2008, such as the Market Abuse Regulation with the aim of reducing financial crime. The paper analyses financial crime cases in the form of insider dealing in Germany only, however the results are believed to be transferrable to other member states. Policy-makers may benefit from this work by gaining a better understanding as to whether the regulation sufficiently deters potential insiders. This shall be assessed by applying the expected utility function known from Economics of Crime concepts to insider dealing. The conviction rate/detection rate of insiders has been found to be low when comparing these to trade activities on the market. The results indicate that unless such insider dealing detection and conviction rates change significantly going forward, more severe sanctions on their own are not sufficient to deter abusers.
Czech name
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Czech description
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Project
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Continuities
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Publication year
2018
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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